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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 2, 1996, the first dispute-settlement panel established under
the provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement' (NAFTA) issued
its final report on the U.S. challenge to Canada's application of tariff-rate
quotas to imports of U.S.-origin agricultural products.2 The panel unanimously
concluded that Canada could apply tariffs in excess of its NAFTA tariff
commitments pursuant to annex 702.1 of the NAFTA.3 This provision,
incorporated into the NAFTA from the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (FTA), retained the rights and obligations of the parties under the
provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade5 (GATT) and
agreements negotiated under the GATT. In making its determination, the panel
thus faced the difficult task of analyzing the negotiating history of both the FTA
and the GATT and interpreting the apparently conflicting requirements of the
World Trade Organization6 (WTO) and the NAFTA. The panel concluded that
Canada's actions were justified. In reaching its conclusion, the panel, instead
of analyzing and applying the relevant legal principles, read into the texts an
implied bargain among the negotiators-a bargain that I will argue was never
struck.
From September 1986 through April 1994, the United States and Canada
were major participants in the negotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture7 in
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, under the auspices of the
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 .L.M. 289, 321.L.M. 605 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA]. This agreement was concluded in December 1992 between the governments of the
United States, Canada, and Mexico to establish a free-trade area.
2. Final Report of the Panel in the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin
Agricultural Products (NAFTA Secretariat File No. CDA-95-2008-01) (Dec. 2,1996) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Panel Report].
3. Id. at 62.
4. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 12, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27
I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter FTA]. The FTA is a bilateral agreement between the United States and
Canada to establish a free-trade area.
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194[hereinafter GATT]. The original GATT was a post-World War n multilateral trade agreement intended
to foster world peace and economic recovery by liberalizing trade regulation. See Text of the General
Agreement, Mar. 1, 1969, GATT B.I.S.D. (vol. 4) at 1 (1969). The GAIT 1947 was administered bya
Council of Representatives of the contracting parties and a permanent secretariat headquartered in Geneva,
Switzerland and presided over by a Director General. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
created in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, succeeded the GATT 1947. General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 21-38 (1994) [hereinafter GATF 1994]. The GAT 1994 sought
principally to avoid free-rider problems stemming from the GAT 1947 provisions for amendments,
protocols of accession, waivers, and other derogations, and to strengthen the legal basis of Uruguay Round
understandings on the interpretation of GAT provisions. There is no difference between the 1947 and 1994
agreements that is relevant to the dispute under consideration.
6. See WTO Agreement, supra note 5. The WTO was created by the Uruguay Round of GAT
negotiations to administer the GATT and other Uruguay Round agreements.
7. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 5, Annex 1A, 39-68
[hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture].
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GATT. Both countries sought substantial liberalization of international trade,
especially trade in agricultural products and commodities. Simultaneously, the
nations were negotiating two free trade agreements-the FTA and the
NAFTA-to liberalize bilateral trade, including trade in agricultural products
and commodities. These agreements were concluded in 1988 and 1992,
respectively. In all of these trade negotiations, Canada sought to preserve its
ability to maintain non-tariff barriers, including absolute quotas on imports of
dairy products, poultry, and eggs, import permits for barley, and a prohibition
on importing oleomargarine.9 After potentially achieving this goal in both the
FTA and the NAFTA, 1° Canada, in the closing days of the Uruguay Round,
agreed to the prohibition of absolute import quotas and other non-tariff barriers
in the Agreement on Agriculture."
Along with the United States and other Uruguay Round participants,
Canada subsequently replaced its existing non-tariff barriers with tariff-rate
quotas-a process known as tariffication.12 However, Canada had already
agreed in both the FTA and the NAFTA to freeze and progressively eliminate
all tariffs on imports of goods originating in the United States. Because the
Uruguay Round established over-quota rates for the tariff-rate quotas at much
higher levels than the rates in Canada's NAFTA tariff commitments, the United
States resorted to NAFTA's dispute-settlement procedures to challenge
Canada's application of the over-quota tariffs to imports of goods originating
in the United States.
Tariffs and non-tariff barriers are different forms of protectionism, but they
may have equivalent economic effects. For example, an absolute quota (a non-
tariff barrier) and a tariff-rate quota, despite their different legal forms, may
have precisely the same effect: limiting the supply of imports to a specified
quantity. 3 However, the three trade agreements relevant to the instant dispute
distinguished between different forms of protectionism by imposing different
obligations with respect to tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Both the FTA and the
8. See JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND 11, 30-31 (1995).
9. More specifically, the products consisted of milk, buttermilk, butter, yogurt, whey, other milk
fats and oils, cheeses, curd, ice cream and other goods containing milk and milk products, chicken and
turkey and derived products, eggs and egg products, barley and barley products, and margarine. For a
precise listing by Harmonized System codes, see Letter from Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative,
to The Honorable Roy MacLaren, Canadian Minister for International Trade 1 (Feb. 2, 1995) (on file with
author).
10. Canada's non-tariff barriers on imports of processed agricultural products may have violated
Article XI of the GAT 1947 and thus they were not legitimated by the PTA and NAFTA provisions upon
which Canada relied for their validity. See infra text accompanying note 52.
11. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 7, art. 4, para. 2.
12. Tariffication replaces quotas and other non-tariff border measures with tariffs designed to
equalize supply at the level of the measure being replaced. The belief is that this will make trade barriers
more transparent and thus easier to compare and eliminate.
13. An absolute quota specifies a quantity that constitutes an absolute limit on imports; any excess
is subject to seizure as smuggled goods. A tariff-rate quota, on the other hand, sets a specific quantity that
is subject to a lower rate of duty, with any excess imports permitted but subject to a higher rate of duty. If
the over-quota tariff rate is set at an economically prohibitive level, a tariff-rate quota operates just like an
absolute quota in its practical economic effects. See EDwiN MANSFmLD, ECONOmICS 361-64 (6th ed. 1989).
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NAFTA required the elimination of tariffs but permitted some absolute quotas
and other non-tariff barriers under limited circumstances.1 4 Thus, under the
NAFTA, tariffs have become an illegal form of protectionism, while some non-
tariff barriers are permissible. In contrast, the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
banned the use of absolute quotas and other non-tariff barriers, but not tariffs
or tariff-rate quotas.15 Consequently, the form of domestic protection permitted
by one agreement was prohibited, in some circumstances, by the other.
The price of admission to the NAFTA was the obligation to eliminate all
tariffs, including those on agricultural products, and Canada solemnly chose to
pay this price to enjoy the benefits of NAFTA membership. Similarly, part of
the price for joining the WTO was an agreement not to use non-tariff barriers
for imports of agricultural products; Canada also chose to pay this price and
gain the benefits of WTO membership. As a result, Canada faced a conflict
between its international obligations to liberalize trade with the United States
in agricultural goods and continued demands for protection by domestic
producers. Canada resolved this conflict by reneging on its NAFTA
commitments.
In its report, the NAFTA panel basically concluded that the negotiators of
both the free trade agreements and the Uruguay Round agreements had agreed
to allow Canada to protect its dairy, poultry, and egg industries from import
competition, and that both the legal form of Canadian protectionism and the
precise rights and obligations spelled out in the agreements were relatively
unimportant. This conclusion is incorrect both as a matter of fact and as a
matter of law.
As the first and, as yet, only formal NAFTA dispute proceeding, the
panel's decision deserves careful examination. It is this author's view that the
panel inappropriately interpreted the relevant NAFTA provisions and virtually
ignored the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994, the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture, and the Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT 1994.16
Moreover, the panel's failure to identify and apply relevant international legal
principles undermines the role of international law in providing transparency
and predictability to dispute resolution. Finally, the result reached by the panel
14. Article 302 of the NAFTA, supra note 1, requires tariff elimination, but article 710 of the FTA,
supra note 4, which was subsequently incorporated into the NAFTA, preserved the right to continue non-
tariff barriers under provisions of the GATT, supra note 5, art. XI, para. 2(c); see also Protocol of
Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GAIT 882-83 (1969), and the GAT waiver for quotas imposed pursuant
to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Waiver Granted to the United States in Connection
with Import Restrictions Imposed Under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act (of
1933), as Amended, Mar. 5, 1955, GAT B.I.S.D. (3d Supp.) at 32-38 (1955) [hereinafter Section 22
Waiver].
15. While the Agreement on Agriculture banned the use of non-tariff barriers, Agreement on
Agriculture, supra note 7, art. 4, para. 2, the GAT required only that tariffs not exceed bound levels,
GAT, supra note 5, art. II, para. 1(b).
16. The Marrakesh Protocol was the formal instrument used to annex the Uruguay Round schedules
of concessions and commitments to the GATIT 1994. See Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 5, Annex IA, 37 [hereinafter
Marrakesh Protocol].
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will reinforce protectionist interests and delay progress toward free trade in
agriculture. This Article will analyze the panel's decision in light of the trade
negotiations leading up to the agreements and the principal provisions of
international law that should have been used to resolve the dispute.
IT. THE DISPUTE: U.S. AND CANADIAN POSITIONS ON AGRICULTURAL
TRADE
A. Agricultural Protectionism in Canada and the United States
Canada's "supply-management" measures for milk, eggs, chicken, turkey,
and broiler hatching eggs predate the FTA.Y7 To implement these measures,
joint federal/provincial agencies administer marketing plans that regulate
production and pricing and may also provide for orderly marketing, levies,
research and promotion, licensing, and the acquisition and disposal of
products. 18 In conjunction with its supply-management measures, Canada
adopted import controls, including import permits and absolute quotas, to
prevent imports from disrupting national supply control and pricing goals. 9
Canada required permits for imports of wheat, oats, and barley' and banned the
importation of margarine.
Prior to 1995, U.S. import protection for agricultural products principally
took the form of import quotas and fees imposed pursuant to the provisions of
section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended.2' Section
22 imposed fees or restrictions on imported articles whenever the President, on
the basis of advice from the Secretary of Agriculture and an investigation by the
U.S. International Trade Commission, found that the conditions or quantities
of their importation would materially interfere with the domestic processing or
production of any agricultural commodity or product.' At the time of the
Uruguay Round, the measures maintained pursuant to section 22 consisted of
17. See In re Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products, Annexes to
Counter-Submission of Canada 5-6 (Feb. 19, 1996) (on file with author). The current programs began with
the introduction of the National Milk Marketing Plan by the Canadian Dairy Commission in 1970 and
continued with the creation of the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency in 1972, the Canadian Turkey Marketing
Agency in 1973, the Canadian Chicken Marketing Agency in 1978, and the Canadian Broiler Hatching Egg
Marketing Agency in 1986. See id. at 6.
18. See id.
19. See id. This was accomplished by listing products on an Import Control List administered by
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
20. Article 705 of the FTA, supra note 4, provided for the elimination of these import permits based
on comparative levels of domestic support.
21. 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1994).
22. Whenever the Secretary of Agriculture had reason to believe that these criteria were met, section
22 required him to advise the President, and if the President agreed, the President was required to request
an investigation. On the basis of this investigation, the Commission submitted its advice to the President.
When the President found that the statutory criteria were met, he was required to impose import fees or
import quotas on the relevant goods. However, when circumstances required emergency treatment, section
22 authorized the President to take immediate action without waiting for the Commission's recommendation.
Such action remained in effect pending the Commission's report and recommendations and presidential
action taken pursuant thereto. See id.
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import quotas on dairy products, cotton, peanuts, and certain sugar-containing
products and a fee on imports of refined sugar.
Because these measures potentially violated U.S. obligations under the
GATT,' the United States sought and obtained a waiver for these provisions
under article XXV of the GATT 1947.24 A Working Party,'s formed to examine
the waiver request, recommended that the waiver be granted.' The contracting
parties debated the Working Party report in a plenary session on March 5,
1955. Canada, among others, criticized the unprecedented scope of the waiver
and the absence of a time limit. Despite these and other objections, the
contracting parties approved the waiver.27
In addition to the section 22 measures, the United States maintained an
absolute quota on imports of both raw and refined sugar pursuant to a provision
in the Tariff Schedules of the United States, which incorporated provisions from
the U.S. GATT Schedule of Concessions.' In 1989 a GATT dispute-settlement
panel concluded that the U.S. sugar import quota was inconsistent with the
general prohibition of quantitative restrictions in article XI: 1 of the GATT 1947
and could not be justified as a term, condition, or qualification of a tariff
concession under article 119 The United States converted this quota to a tariff-
rate quota in 1990 in order to comply with its GATT obligations."
B. Negotiations To Reduce Agricultural Protectionism
1. Multilateral Trade Liberalization: The GAYT 1947
The United States and Canada were among the founding Contracting
Parties of the GATT 1947.11 This major multilateral trade agreement was
designed to liberalize world trade after the disastrous protectionist policies that
23. See KENNmH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 260
(1970).
24. See id. See generally JACKSON, supra note 14, at 541-52 (discussing waivers under article XXV
of GATT 1947).
25. A Working Party is simply a formal group of representatives from interested member countries
formed to examine a specific issue. See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, Annex, para. 6, GATr B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210, 216-17
(1980).
26. The Working Party agreed to limit the waiver to articles H and XI and specified six conditions,
including the requirement of annual reports and an annual review by the GATr contracting parties. See
Section 22 Waiver, supra note 14, at 141-45.
27. See id. at 34; see also United States-Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar-
Containing Products Applied Under the 1955 Waiver and Under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff
Concessions, Nov. 7, 1990, GAIT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 228 (1991).
28. See United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(upholding presidential proclamation establishing trade restrictions).
29. The panel was established at the request of Australia. See United States Restrictions on Imports
of Sugar, June 22, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 331 (1990).
30. See Proclamation No. 6179, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,293 (1990) (converting sugar quota to tariff-rate
quota by presidential proclamation).
31. See 1 FINAL ACr ADOPTED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY
COMMrTTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, U.N. Sales No.
1947.11.10 (1947).
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resulted from the Great Depression and World War H.3 As originally
conceived, the GATT 1947 recorded the results of multilateral trade
negotiations that reduced and bound import tariff rates." Commercial policy
provisions taken from the draft charter34 of the proposed International Trade
Organization were added to protect the value of tariff concessions .3 The GATT
1947 required contracting parties to grant unconditional most-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment 6 and nondiscriminatory national treatment 7 to imports and
generally prohibited non-tariff import restrictions. 8
Largely at the insistence of the United States, the GATT 1947 adopted a
major exception to the general requirement in article XI to eliminate
quantitative restrictions. This exception, contained in article XI:2(c)(i), allowed
import quotas on certain agricultural and fisheries products under specified
circumstances. Such quotas were permitted if necessary to enforce the
maintenance of domestic restrictions on the quantities of an agricultural
commodity permitted to be produced or marketed.39 Panel rulings in the late
1980s, however, applied numerous conditions to the exception, making it very
difficult for an import restriction to be justified under article XI:2(c)(i).4 °
There have been eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under the
32. See ROBERT E. HuDEc, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DipLOMACY 5-10 (2d
ed. 1990).
33. See id. at 49-52; see also DAM, supra note 23, at 10-12.
34. This was known as the "Havana Charter." See CLuARWILCox, A CHARTER FoR WORLD TRADE
231-327 (1949) (reprinting text of Charter).
35. See DAM, supra note 23, at 10-11.
36. GAT, supra note 5, art. I.
37. Id. art. I, para. 4.
38. Id. art. XI, para. 1.
39. Article XI:2 provides, in relevant part:
The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following:
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form, necessary
to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate:
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or produced,
or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for
which the imported product can be directly substituted; ....
Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any product pursuant to sub-
paragraph (c) of this paragraph shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the
product permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any change in such
quantity or value. Moreover, any restrictions applied under (i) above shall not be such as will
reduce the total of imports relative to the total of domestic production, as compared with the
proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule between the two in the absence of
restrictions. In determining this proportion, the contracting party shall pay due regard to the
proportion prevailing during a previous representative period and to any special factors which
may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product concerned.
Id. art. XI, para. 2. An interpretive note in article XI elaborates on the meaning of the phrase "any
agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form" as follows: "The term 'in any form' in this
paragraph covers the same products when in an early stage of processing and still perishable, which compete
directly with the fresh product and if freely imported would tend to make the restriction on the fresh product
ineffective." Id. art. XI, para. 2(c).
40. For an extensive analysis of the requirements of article XI:2(c)(i), see Japan-Restrictions on
Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163 (1989).
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GATT. 41 The early rounds were devoted largely to tariff reductions, while the
later rounds produced additional substantive agreements. 42 In several of the pre-
1986 rounds, Canada made tariff concessions on virtually all of the specific
tariff duty rates relevant to the present dispute.43 The last round, launched at a
meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, replaced the original GATT 1947 with the
GATT 1994 and created the World Trade Organization to administer the GATT
and other Uruguay Round trade agreements."
2. Bilateral Trade Liberalization: The PTA
In May 1986, a few months before the Uruguay Round negotiations got
underway, the United States and Canada embarked on negotiations for a
bilateral free-trade agreement. At the end of 1987, the parties concluded the
FTA. 45 The United States and Canada agreed that neither party could increase
any existing customs duty or introduce new duties on goods originating in the
territory of the other party. They also agreed that each party would
progressively eliminate all of its customs duties on goods originating in the
other nation.' The parties could not agree, however, on the elimination of
import quotas on agricultural products. While the FTA did not expressly
authorize the use of quantitative restrictions, many of the provisions of chapter
seven acknowledge the applicability of absolute quotas.47 In particular, article
710 of the FTA, by affirming the parties' respective rights and obligations
under the GATT, implicitly allows the use of quantitative import restrictions
that are GATT consistent. This provision thus permits the use of import quotas
consistent with article XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT, the GATT Protocol of
Provisional Application, or the section 22 waiver granted to the United States.4"
Article 710 of the FTA, subsequently incorporated into the NAFTA, was to
41. These have been the original Geneva Round (1947), the Annecy Round (1949), the Torquay
Round (1951), the second Geneva Round (1956), the Dillon Round (1960-61), the Kennedy Round
(1963-67), the Tokyo Round (1973-79), and the Uruguay Round (1986-94). See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN
& MIcHAEL M. Kosmciu, THE POZxncAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO
WTO 12-20 (1995).
42. See, e.g., THETXs OF THE ToKYo RouND AGREEMENTS (1986) (including provisions of six
substantive "codes" negotiated during Tokyo Round).
43. See Schedule V (Canada) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, supra note
5.
44. For a more detailed discussion of the Uruguay round, see infra Subsection H.B.3.
45. The agreement was signed by President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on
January 2, 1988. See RoNALD REAGAN, COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
Lm-E OF TRAsNrrrAL, H.R. Doc. No. 100-216, at iii (2d Sess. 1988).
46. See FTA, supra note 4, art. 401, paras. 1-2.
47. FTA, supra note 4, arts. 704 (meat), 705 (grains), 706 (poultry and eggs), 707 (sugar-containing
products).
48. This interpretation of article 710 was confirmed, in part, by paragraph 4 of annex 702.1 of the
NAFTA, which states:
The Parties understand that Article 710 of the [FDA] incorporates the GATT rights and
obligations of Canada and the United States with respect to agricultural, food, beverage and
certain related goods, including exemptions by virtue of paragraph (1)(b) of the Protocol of
Provisional Application of the GATT and waivers granted under Article XXV of the GATT.
NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 702.1, para. 4.
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become the basis of Canada's defense in the dispute with the United States.
Canada maintained that its restrictions on imports of dairy products,
poultry, and eggs were justified under article XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT, and that
its import prohibition with respect to margarine was justified under the
"grandfathering" provisions of the GATT Protocol of Provisional Application.49
Thus, Canada viewed these import restrictions as falling within article 710 of
the FTA, which retained rights under the GATT. Prior to the FTA negotiations,
only Canada's supply-management program and its import quotas for eggs had
been subjected to scrutiny under the GATT. Over the objection of the United
States, a 1976 Working Party concluded in an advisory ruling that the Canadian
supply-management program for eggs was in conformity with article
XI:2(c)(i)."
On September 28, 1988, Congress approved the FTA by enacting the
United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988'1 and
the FTA entered into force on January 1, 1989.
After the FTA had entered into force but prior to the start of the NAFTA
negotiations, a GATT dispute-settlement panel concluded that Canadian quotas
on imports of ice cream and yogurt were in violation of article XI and declined
to rule that the Canadian supply-management program for milk qualified as an
effective restriction on domestic milk production.' The panel's reasoning threw
into question the ability of Canada or any other country, consistent with the
GATT, to restrict imports of a wide range of processed dairy products in
connection with the maintenance of raw milk supply management. The panel's
decision also undermined Canada's GATT and FTA justifications for import
quotas on processed poultry and egg products. 3 Canada accepted the panel
report but announced that it would maintain its ice cream and yogurt quotas
pending the outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Shortly thereafter,
Canada proposed in the Uruguay Round to "clarify" and "strengthen" GATT
article X:2(c)(i) by reaffirming the right to use absolute import quotas in
defense of supply management and increasing the scope of products subject to
49. The Protocol was intended to allow the original contracting parties to the GATT 1947 to agree
to the substantive rules of the draft Havana Charter without needing to amend existing legislation. See
Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Apples and Pears, June 22, 1989, paras 5.4-5.5., GAIT B.I.S.D. (361h
Supt'.) at 319 (1990).
50. See Canadian Import Quotas on Eggs, Feb. 17, 1976, GAIT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 92 (1977).
However, the Vorling Party was unable to approve the representative period that Canada used to determine
the quota quantity and abstained from expressing an opinion on whether the import quota nullified or
impaired the value of Canadian tariff bindings on the products. See id. at 92-93.
51. Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851.
52. See Canada Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, Dec. 5,1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (361h
Supp.) at 91, 93 (1990). The panel refused to find in Canada's favor on any of the criteria for the exception,
other than to note that ice cream and yogurt were "agricultural" products and that the import quotas were
restrictions rather than prohibitions. The United States did not contest either of these points. See id. at
71-73, 84-93.
53. If Canada's supply-management program for milk did not meet the requirements of the
exception, it is doubtful that the similar programs for poultry and eggs would have qualified. See id. at
91-92.
1997]
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permissible import restrictions.'
3. The Uruguay Round and the Concept of Tariffication
In September 1986, the United States, Canada, and the other contracting
parties to the GATT 1947 launched the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, which continued for more than seven years until the signing
ceremony in Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994.11 The Punta del Este
Declaration56 launching the Uruguay Round established ambitious goals and
objectives for further liberalizing world trade and for strengthening and
expanding the coverage of GATT rules and disciplines." With respect to
agriculture, the negotiators agreed that there was an "urgent need to bring more
discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and
preventing restrictions and distortions including those related to structural
surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalances and instability in world
agricultural markets.""8 The Punta del Este Declaration called for bringing "all
measures affecting import access . . . under strengthened and more
operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines" 59 by "improving market
access through, inter alia, the reduction of import barriers. "I The United States
and Canada put forth their original proposals in the Uruguay Round Negotiating
Group on Agriculture in 1987.61
On November 9, 1988, the United States formally introduced the concept
of "tariffication" in the Uruguay Round and proposed that all non-tariff barriers
to imports be converted to fixed tariff equivalents according to guidelines
referred to as "modalities."62 The typical model for tariffication involved
54. See Canadian Proposal on GATT Article XI (Mar. 13, 1990) (on file with author). Canada's
proposal, promulgated in the Negotiating Group on Agriculture, sought to broaden the "like product"
criteria to include all processed products made "wholly or mainly" from the fresh product subject to
domestic supply control. Id.
55. See CROOME, supra note 8, at 3-4.
56. The Punta del Este Declaration is formally known as the Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay
Round of 20 September 1986, GATr B.I.S.D. (33d Supp.) at 19 (1987) [hereinafter Punta del Este
Declaration].
57. Id. at 20.
58. Id. at 24.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 40.
61. The United States tabled its first proposal on July 7, 1987 and called for a complete phase-out
over 10 years of all import barriers. See GATT Secretariat, United States Proposal for Negotiations on
Agriculture, MTNGNG/NG5/W/14 (July 7, 1987) hereinafter July 1987 U.S. Proposal]. Canada tabled
its first proposal on October 20, 1987 and called for the "elimination of all ... access barriers, over a
period to be negotiated" including a "major improvement in secure and predictable access" to be phased
in over five years. GATT Secretariat, Proposal by Canada Regarding the Multilateral Trade Negotiations
in Agriculture, MTN.GNG/NG5V/19, at 3 (Oct. 20, 1987). The Canadian proposal did not indicate that
import quotas and permits for supply-management products should receive any special treatment. See id.
62. See GATT Secretariat, A FrameworkforAgricultural Reform Submitted by the United States,
MTN.GNG/NG5/W/83 (Nov. 9, 1988). The declaration establishing the Uruguay Round had called only
for the "reduction of import barriers" for agricultral products. Punta del Este Declaration, supra note 56,
at 57. The earlier U.S. proposal, see July 1987 U.S. Proposal, supra note 61, and a February 1988
discussion paper, see GATr Secretariat, A Discussion Paper on Issues Related to the Negotiations Submitted
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converting an absolute quota into a tariff-rate quota, where the within-quota
tariff rate would remain the same as the preexisting rate and the new over-quota
tariff rate would be set at a level equal to the price gap between domestic and
world prices created by the quota. In addition, the quota quantity would be
bound at a level that would preserve current access opportunities or create
minimum access opportunities. Thus, the new tariff-rate quota would provide
import protection roughly equivalent to the former absolute quota. Tariffication
was intended to improve transparency and bring about the reduction of barriers
to market access. Subsequent U.S. proposals and discussion papers' amplified
the concept of tariffication, which was eventually supported by the Cairns
Group. 4 Canada, however, continued to argue for the retention of absolute
quotas pursuant to a "clarified and strengthened" article XI:2(c)(i) 5
On July 11, 1990, Mr. Aart de Zeeuw, then chairman of the Negotiating
Group on Agriculture, issued a draft of a "Framework Agreement" outlining
a "framework of modalities for negotiation. "I The de Zeeuw text called for the
submission of proposals and "country lists" that included, inter alia, the
conversion of non-tariff barriers on imports to tariff equivalents. The draft
agreement provided, however, that "the tabling of these country lists shall be
without prejudice to the possibility of negotiating specific solutions in case of
particular situations which may exist for some products. "67 In response to the
de Zeeuw text, Canada proposed "the conversion to tariff equivalents of all
import prohibitions, variable import levies, import quotas and all other non-
tariff barriers, except those allowed by the new or revised GATT rules,
particularly in respect of Article XI."s The Canadian offer also included a draft
interpretive note for article XI:2(c), outlining its earlier proposal. The Canadian
schedule of tariff offers omitted rates for dairy, poultry, and egg products on
Canada's import control list and noted that the "[o]ffer [would] be determined
in light of clarification of Article XI:2(c)."69 Similarly, Austria, Finland,
Korea, Norway, and Switzerland tabled proposals to exclude from tariffication
by the United States, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/44 (Feb. 22, 1988), did not suggest tariffication. Nor was this
concept expressed in the October 1987 proposals of the Cairns Group, see GAIT Secretariat, Cairns Group
Proposal to the Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on Agriculture, MTN.GNGING5/W/21 (Oct. 26, 1987),
or in the proposals of the European Communities, see GAT Secretariat, European Communities Proposal
for Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Agriculture, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/20 (Oct. 26, 1987); see also
CROOME, supra note 8, at 233-34.
63. See, e.g., GATT Secretariat, Submission of the United States on Comprehensive Long-Term
Agricultural Reform, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/118 (Oct. 25, 1989); GATT Secretariat, U.S. Discussion Paper
on Tariffication, MTN.GNGING5/W/97 (July 10, 1989).
64. The Cairns Group was comprised of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. See CRoomE, supra
note 8, at 31 n.4.
65. See GATT Secretariat, Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Canadian Proposal on GATTArticle
XI, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/159 (Mar. 13, 1990).
66. GAIT Secretariat, Framework Agreement on Agriculture Reform Programme: Draft Text by the
Chairman, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/170 (July 11, 1990).
67. Id. para. 13.
68. GATE Secretariat, Canada-Offer Submitted Pursuant to MTN.TNC./15, at 2 (Oct. 5, 1990)
(on file with author).
69. Id.
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those products subject to article XI:2(c)(i) import restrictions. 0
In late 1990, Canada explicitly learned of the U.S. view on the implications
for tariffication posed by the FTA tariff provisions when President Bush
converted the U.S. absolute quota on imported sugar into a tariff-rate quota.71
Although a 1.1% share of the absolute quota had been allocated to Canada, it
did not receive a share of the new tariff-rate quota. The United States based this
action on the tariff freeze and elimination provisions in article 401 of the FTA,
which required exempting Canadian sugar from the new over-quota rate of duty
since it exceeded the rate bound in the FTA. The United States also sought a
"gentleman's agreement" whereby Canada would voluntarily restrain its exports
to its former 1.1% share. 3
Tariffication received a further boost in December 1990 during the
ministerial-level Uruguay Round Closing Conference in Brussels. When the
negotiations on agriculture appeared to reach a deadlock, Swedish Minister
Mats Hellstr6m proposed a compromise that called, inter alia, for the
"[m]aintenance of 1990 conditions of access for all products, including
processed products, on the basis of modalities, including tariffication, to be
agreed as part of this negotiation. "I The Hellstr6m proposal was rejected, most
notably by the European Community.75
During technical discussions in 1991 in the Negotiating Group on
Agriculture,76 Canada continued to argue for retaining and clarifying the ability
to use import restrictions in conjunction with domestic supply-management
programs. Canadian negotiators worked to enlist the support of third countries
for this position. At the close of the 1991 technical discussions, then chairman
of the Group on Agriculture, Arthur Dunkel, tabled a Draft Final Act (DFA)
70. See GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Agriculture-Survey of Offers, MTN.TNCW/35, App. B, at 142, 145-47
(Nov. 1990). The survey also noted that India and Japan had made no offer of tariffication and that Iceland,
Mexico, and South Africa had offered tariffication subject to exceptions. The European Communities' offer
included tariffication pursuant to a unique methodology and contingent on the "rebalancing" of tariff
bindings, but a separate proposal on rules contemplated retaining article XI:2(c)(i) by providing for an
interpretation of it. In addition, many developing countries had not made any offer in the agriculture
negotiations. On the other hand, the proposals tabled on October 15, 1990 by the United States, Sweden,
and the Cairns Group supported comprehensive tariffication of all non-tariff border measures, including
import quotas maintained in conformity with article XI:2(c)(i).
71. See Proclamation No. 6179, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,293 (1990).
72. See Letter from Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Representative, to George Bush, President of the
United States 1 (Aug. 28, 1990) (on file with author) (explaining that "Canada would be exempt from the
tariff-rate quota due to an obligation to reduce tariffs which is provided for in the United States-Canada
Free-Trade Agreement").
73. Canada's sugar exports increased dramatically, however, substantially exceeding its previously
allocated share. See ECONOMIC REsEARcH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF Araic., SUGAR AND SwA=ENER SITUATION
AND OUTLOOK YEARBOOK 71 tbl.27 (1995).
74. Elements for Negotiation of a Draft Agreement on the Agricultural Reform Programme
(informal "white paper" not issued as GATT document) (on file with author).
75. See CROOmE, supra note 8, at 278-80.
76. The Negotiating Group on Agriculture was chaired at that time by Arthur Dunkel. Mr. Dunkel,
the Director General of the GATT, also served as Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee.
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intended to serve as the basis for concluding the Uruguay Round.' Rejecting
the Canadian approach, the DFA provided for comprehensive tariffication.78 In
response to the DFA, Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, and Switzerland
issued a joint statement:
We believe that comprehensive tariffication without exception should not be considered as the
only way to contribute to the expansion of agricultural trade. While some of us have other
reasons for having proposed that there should be carefully circumscribed exceptions to the
concept of comprehensive tariffication, the following participants are united in the view that,
consistent with the agreed objectives of the round, GATT Article XI:2(c)(i) must be
strengthened and clarified and that the provisions of the draft text on agriculture be modified
to exclude from tariffication trade measures taken consistent with Article XI.
79
Although the DFA was not revised to accommodate those concerns, several
countries including the European Union, Sweden, and Japan succeeded in
negotiating market access commitments that varied substantially from the DFA
modalities."0
Part B of the Text on Agriculture contained in the 1991 DFA consisted of
a draft "Agreement on Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding
Commitments Under the Reform Programme." 8 Paragraph 4 called for the
comprehensive tariffication of all non-tariff border measures pursuant to the
modalities provided in annex 3 of part B, which addressed the calculation of
tariff equivalents and requirements concerning current and minimum access
opportunities.a
4. The North American Free Trade Agreement
The United States, Canada, and Mexico began negotiating the NAFTA in
1991. An internal Canadian discussion paper prepared in March 1991 noted that
the parallel NAFTA and GATT Uruguay Round negotiations might require
some elements of a NAFTA agreement to be conditional on the outcome of the
Uruguay Round.' The paper acknowledged that Canadian supply-management
77. GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNCV/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Dunkel Draft].
78. Id. atL.19, L.25.
79. GATT Secretariat, Article XI:2(c)(i): Statement by Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway and
Switzerland, MTN.GNG/AG/W/6 (Dec. 18, 1991); see also CROOME, supra note 8, at 329.
80. See Kevin T. Brosch, The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, in THE GAIT, THE WTO
AND THE URUGUAY RouND AGoxEmErs Acr 865, 876-77 (H. Applebaum & L. Schitt eds., 1995). Korea
and Switzerland also negotiated commitments that varied significantly from the DFA modalities.
81. GATT Secretariat, Text on Agriculture: Agreement on Modalities for the Establishment of
Specific Binding Commitments Under the Reform Programme, MTN.TNC/W/FA, Part B, at L.19 (Dec. 20,
1991).
82. The negotiators never accepted these modalities. While the negotiations on market access for
agricultural products were conducted loosely on the basis of the draft modalities, the widespread departure
in practice from the modalities became known as "dirty tariffication." See Brosch, supra note 80, at 876.
In particular, many participants exceeded the price gap in setting tariff equivalent rates or evaded current
and minimum access commitments. See id.
83. Internal Canadian Discussion Paper (Mar. 1991) (on file with author). With respect to import
controls under article XI, the Canadian paper noted:
This issue is perhaps best dealt with in a multilateral forum, as it relates to GATT rights and
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systems could only be preserved by retaining GATT article XI rights, as
modified in the Uruguay Round, but it did not specifically address the interface
between tariffication and tariff elimination. Recognizing these problems,
attorneys for both the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture concluded that Uruguay Round tariffication of quotas would be
incompatible with NAFTA tariff elimination. 4
At the February 1992 NAFTA Ministerial meeting, the United States and
Mexico agreed to tariffication of all non-tariff restrictions on imports of
agricultural products. Canada, however, refused to abandon the use of absolute
import quotas on agricultural goods. As a result, the agriculture negotiations
essentially split into three bilateral negotiations,85 and the NAFTA bears the
marks, of this fissure. The provisions for market access include a section for
trade between Mexico and the United States, a section for trade between
Canada and Mexico, and a section incorporating most of the FTA provisions
for trade between the United States and Canada.86
Canada negotiated with Mexico for an explicit exception to tariff
elimination for its imports of dairy, poultry, and eggs. sY This bilateral exception
allows either party to invoke its rights and obligations under GATT article
XI:2(c)(i) to restrict imports of such goods.8" Consequently, the Canadian
NAFTA Schedule does not provide for tariff reductions on imports of such
goods from Mexico.
The United States refused to agree to such exceptional treatment for dairy,
poultry, and eggs. Thus, the Canadian NAFTA Schedule shows straight-line
tariff elimination for imports of such goods originating in the United States. The
United States and Canada postponed resolution of their disagreement over
quota-protected products by incorporating the relevant provisions of the FTA
into the NAFTA. In so doing, both countries sought to reconcile their different
positions in the Uruguay Round negotiations. When Canada submitted its draft
Uruguay Round schedules on market access on March 4, 1992, it reiterated its
position that GATT article XI:2(c)(i) should be clarified and strengthened. At
obligations. Canadian supply-management systems will require that NAFTA preserve the GATT
Article XI rights of each party, as modified in the Uruguay Round. This is specifically allowed
in paragraph 8(b) of Article XXIV of the GAIT.
Id. para. 80.
84. See Memorandum from Andrew W. Shoyer, Assistant General Counsel, U.S. Trade
Representative (Sept. 30, 1991) (on file with author). Shoyer noted that if the United States were to tariffy
quotas on imports of agricultural products it could not apply the new tariffs to products from its free-trade
agreement partners. He concluded:
If the NAFrA is completed before tariffication of agricultural quotas is achieved in the Uruguay
Round, the NAFTA parties might provide an explicit exception to the prohibition on new duties
for tariffs created in the future through the conversion (and consequent elimination) of quotas.
If such a provision is not included in the NAFTA, subsequent tariffication probably would
require modification to the agreement.
Id. at2.
85. See Terence J. Centner, changes Impacting Production Agriculture: NAFTA and New
Environmental Regulations, 24 U. ToL. L. REv. 371, 373 (1993).
86. See NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 703.2.
87. See id. Annex 703.2, see. B, paras. 3-7.
88. See id. Annex 703.2, sec. B, para. 7(a)-(b).
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the same time, in bilateral discussions in Geneva and Washington in mid-1992,
the United States insisted that tariffication be comprehensive and that NAFTA's
tariff freeze and elimination rules would prevent Canada from introducing new
tariff equivalents. Despite these differences, the parties concluded the
negotiations in Washington in August and signed the NAFTA between
December 8 and 17, 1992.
5. The Conclusion of the Uruguay Round
Serious market access negotiations between the United States and Canada
in the Uruguay Round only began after the Canadian elections of October 1993
changed the ruling party. During the first thirteen days of December, the parties
engaged in ten bilateral negotiating sessions in Geneva, including three at the
ministerial level. The feverish negotiations were fueled by both countries'
realization that tariffication in the Uruguay Round could be challenged under
the NAFTA tariff freeze and elimination provisions. Generally, Canada favored
applying the Uruguay Round tariff equivalents to imports originating in the
territory of the other party. 9 The United States rejected such an exemption
from the NAFTA tariff-elimination provisions, proposing instead to eliminate
all tariff equivalents over a six to fifteen year period. The parties failed to
produce a bilateral agreement before the close of negotiations on December 15,
1993.
Both Canada and the United States, however, agreed to tariffication in the
Uruguay Round. Ongoing multilateral negotiations during December 1993
yielded major relevant modifications to the DFA that, in turn, resulted in the
creation of the draft Agreement on Agriculture. First, the negotiators agreed to
create the Agreement on Agriculture out of the provisions of part A of the
DFA, including only some of the modalities of part B. They deliberately struck
the remaining provisions of part B, including the draft tariffication modalities. 90
On December 20, 1993, the Chairman of the Market Access Group issued these
modalities as a Chairman's note solely for purposes of completion and
verification of draft schedules. 91 Second, the negotiators made several
substantial changes to the draft agreement with respect to market access. Japan
and Korea negotiated "special treatment" provisions that permitted qualifying
countries to retain temporary absolute import quotas despite the general ban on
such quotas, and Switzerland negotiated changes to the special safeguard
provisions applicable to products subject to tariffication. 92 Canada supported
89. See Draft CanadalU.S. Agreement on Agriculture, Dec. 8, 1993, art. 103 (on file with author).
90. Initially, the United States favored retaining the tariffication modalities, but its position was not
supported. The provisions relating to tariffication were thus attached to annex 5, regarding the permitted
temporary exceptions to the prohibition on maintaining non-tariff barriers, to guide future tariffication.
91. See GAIT Secretariat, Modalltiesfor the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments Under
the Reform Programme: Note by the Chairman of the Market Access Group, MTN.GNGIMAIW/24 (Dec.
20, 1993).
92. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 7, Annex 5, art. 5; see also Brosch, supra note 80,
at 876-77.
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scuttling the tariffication modalities in part B but did not negotiate for changes
in the special treatment or special safeguard provisions. In addition to these
changes in the draft agreement, the Trade Negotiating Committee decided in the
final days that tariff equivalents resulting from tariffication of agricultural non-
tariff barriers would not override prior tariff bindings.
On December 15, 1993, the Director General of the GATT closed
negotiations on the Uruguay Round agreements.' On the same date, Canada
notified the GATT Secretariat that it would accept tariffication.3 Shortly
thereafter, the NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994. At this point,
Canada observed all of its NAFTA tariff obligations and continued to maintain
absolute quotas. The United States and Canada met in January 1994 in
Washington and Toronto to discuss tariffication. Fearing the NAFTA
implications for tariffication, Canada threatened not to submit a GATT tariff
schedule until it completed negotiations with the United States. Nevertheless,
on February 24, 1994, Canada submitted draft final schedules on market access
that included tariffication of its prior import quotas. The parties met again in
March and April but failed to resolve the agriculture issues.
On April 15, 1994, both parties, along with many other countries, signed
the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, which included the WTO Agreement and the Agreement
on Agriculture.9' The schedules of the participants were annexed to the
Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT 1994. The United States and Canada
continued negotiations regarding agricultural goods subject to quotas but
ultimately reached an agreement only on wheat trade.
On January 1, 1995, both the United States and Canada implemented
revised tariff schedules to reflect changes in their respective GATT schedules.
Both countries' tariff schedules applied tariff-rate quotas to imports of
agricultural goods originating in the other country. Just one month later, on
February 2, the United States requested consultations with Canada pursuant to
chapter 20 of the NAFTA on Canada's application of over-quota tariffs to
imports of dairy, poultry, eggs, barley, and margarine originating in the United
States.
93. See CRoom, supra note 8, at 379-80.
94. See Letter from T.G. Norman, Canadian Agriculture Representative in Geneva, to Frank
Wolter, Director, Agriculture and Commodities Division of the GATT Secretariat 1 (Dec. 15, 1993) (on
file with author). Canada stated that it would submit revised schedules to include "tariffication of Canada's
existing non-tariff barriers in the supply managed sectors, i.e., dairy products, chicken, turkeys, eggs, and
broiler hatching eggs and chicks." Id.
95. See CRooME, supra note 8, at 3-4.
96. Marrakesh Protocol, supra note 16. On September 27, 1994, President Clinton transmitted a
draft implementation bill and Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) to Congress. With respect to the
tariffication of quotas on imports of agricultural products, the SAA provided:
Although WTO Members may replace non-tariff barriers with tariff equivalents without running
afoul of their obligations under the GATr 1994, the NAFTA imposes independent obligations
governing the tariffs that NAFTA countries may apply to imports of North American-origin
goods. The NAFTA sets maximum tariff rates for such imports and requires that all tariffs
applied to those goods be eliminated over time.
H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 712 (1994).
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HI. THE NAFTA PANEL DECISION
A. Formation of the Panel
After consultations had proven fruitless, the U.S. Trade Representative
requested on July 14, 1995 that an arbitral panel be established pursuant to
article 2008 of the NAFTA. 97 The panel's members were Professor Elihu
Lauterpacht of the United Kingdom, selected to chair the panel, Professors
Ronald C.C. Cuming and Donald M. McRae of Canada, and Sidney Picker, Jr.
and Dean Stephen Zamora of the United States. 98 The panel received an initial
written submission from the United States and a counter-submission from
Canada in the first two months of the year.99 A two day session for oral
arguments followed in March." After both parties filed supplementary written
submissions, the panel circulated its initial report in July"'1 and allowed the
parties to file written comments. The panel issued its final report, without
dissent, on December 2, 1996.
B. The Decision of the Panel
1. Holding
The panel held that Canada's application of the over-quota rates to imports
of U.S. agricultural products did not violate the NAFTA.1 The precise legal
issue that the panel faced was whether Canada's application of the over-quota
rates was inconsistent with the tariff freeze and elimination provisions of article
302 of the NAFTA. In reaching its decision, the panel focused on FTA article
710, which incorporated into the NAFTA all the rights and obligations of the
parties under the GATT. The panelists construed FTA article 710 as an
exception to NAFTA article 302. The panelists reasoned that, consistent with
article 710, Canada had exercised a right to tariffication under the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture and was therefore not in violation of NAFTA
article 302.
2. Rationale
The NAFTA tariff freeze and elimination provisions of article 302 prohibit
increasing any tariffs existing on December 31, 1993 or introducing any new
97. See Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 1.
98. See id. para. 3.
99. See id. para. 5.
100. See id. para. 6.
101. See id. para. 7.
102. See id. para. 208.
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customs duties. 10 These provisions also require that the parties progressively
eliminate all tariffs on goods originating in the other countries, subject to
exceptions provided elsewhere in the NAFTA. °4 The United States and Canada
did not dispute that Canada's over-quota rates of duty exceeded the tariff rates
in Canada's NAFTA schedule and that Canada did not intend to eliminate these
tariffs by January 1, 1998, the date for elimination of all other tariffs on U.S.-
origin goods. Accordingly, the panel found that the provisos to paragraphs 1
and 2 of article 302-"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Agreement"-were
applicable.
In the panel's opinion, FTA article 710, which was incorporated into the
NAFTA by paragraph I of annex 702.1, qualified as an exception to the article
302 provisions. Article 710 of the FTA provides:
Unless otherwise specifically provided in this Chapter, the Parties retain their rights and
obligations with respect to agricultural, food, beverage and certain related goods under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and agreements negotiated under the
GATT, including their rights and obligations under GATT Article XI.105
Canada did not assert, and the panel did not conclude, that Canada acted
pursuant to a retained right under the GATT 1947 or the GATT 1994 to raise
tariffs on the goods at issue. To the contrary, as discussed below, the tariff
rules of the GATT 1947 and the GATT 1994 were simply not addressed. These
rules do not support a finding that Canada had any such right. Moreover, the
United States pointed out that if FTA article 710 were to apply to all GATT
tariff bindings for "agricultural, food, beverage and certain related goods," this
would negate all of the tariff reductions that had already taken place pursuant
to the FTA and the NAFTA on a vast array of products not at issue in the case.
The panel accepted that not all GATT rights with respect to tariffs could be
incorporated,"es and the panel was careful to limit the reach of FTA article 710
to WTO tariffs resulting from tariffication. 7
The United States' principal argument regarding FTA article 710 was that
it "retained" rights and obligations existing at the time the FTA was concluded.
Such rights and obligations, the United States argued, were "frozen in time" to
1988-89 and, therefore, could not be interpreted to include the results of the
Uruguay Round."'8 The panel devoted most of its analysis to this issue,
ultimately concluding that article 710 was "forward-looking" and thus
incorporated the rights and obligations from the Uruguay Round agreements. 10
103. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 302, para. 1.
104. Id. art. 302, para. 2.
105. FTA, supra note 4, art. 710.
106. See Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 201 ("FTA Article 710 does not mandate the wholesale
bringing into the NAFTA of GATT, and now of WTO, rights and obligations.").
107. See id. para. 199 ("These rights and obligations brought into NAFTA include ... the right to
apply the tariffs that resulted from tariffication. . . ."). But see id. para. 187 ("In practice, tariffication
included the creation of tariffs where there was no direct equivalency with a prior non-tariff barrier.").
108. Id. para. 32. See generally id. paras. 133-67 (comparing U.S. and Canadian arguments
regarding FTA article 710).
109. Id. paras. 155-67.
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Canada argued that the WTO Agreement on Agriculture constituted an
agreement negotiated under the GATT. Article 4.2 of the Agreement on
Agriculture and the modalities document required that Canada raise its tariffs
on the goods at issue by converting its absolute quotas and other non-tariff
barriers into tariff equivalents.110 Canada argued that this requirement
constituted an obligation retained by FTA article 710 because the underlying
agreement was negotiated under the GATT. The panel rejected this approach
in light of the fact that article 4.2 addresses an obligation to refrain from the use
of non-tariff barriers rather than the obligation to apply tariff equivalents." 1
Instead, the panel interpreted FTA article 710 as
bringing into the NAFTA the replacement regime for agricultural non-tariff barriers that was
established under the WTO. This consists of an obligation not to introduce or maintain such
non-tariff barriers and the right to apply the tariffs that resulted from tariffication, as set out
in their tariff schedules, to over-quota imports of agricultural products, together with the
obligation to reduce those tariffs and ensure certain minimum volumes of imports. These
rights are not diminished by NAFTA Article 302(1).
112
Thus, the panel concluded that article 710 incorporated into the NAFTA a right
to apply the tariffs resulting from tariffication and that this right constituted an
exception to the NAFTA tariff obligations in article 302.
The panelists found this "right" not in the language of article 4.2 of the
Agreement on Agriculture but in the context of the Uruguay Round negotiations
in general. They concluded that the parties to these negotiations understood and
accepted that non-tariff border measures would be eliminated in return for the
right to impose equivalent tariff protection. The panel noted that this
fundamental bargain was reflected in the DFA and the modalities for
tariffication, though not in the Agreement on Agriculture."' In the panel's
view, the right to establish tariff equivalents was the quid pro quo for the
removal of non-tariff barriers: "Mhe entitlement to establish and apply tariff
equivalents was, in the minds of the participants, inextricably linked with the
obligation to remove non-tariff baliers.""' The panel had little difficulty
finding that FTA article 710 incorporated into the NAFTA this imaginary right
to apply tariffs resulting from tariffication." 5
FTA article 710, however, neither explicitly addresses tariffs nor explicitly
provides an exception to paragraphs 1 and 2 of NAFTA article 302. In addition,
article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture does not, on its face, confer a right
to raise tariffs. Finally, the panel's decision fails to consider the GATT system
of tariff rules. It does not address the roles of articles II, XXIV, and XXVI
110. See id. para. 168. Article 4.2 provides: "Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any
measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties, except as
otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5." Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 7, art 4., para.
2 (emphasis added). A footnote provides an illustrative list of measures covered by the ban. See id.
111. See Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 185.
112. Id. para. 208.
113. See id. para. 179.
114. Id. para. 181.
115. Seeid. paras. 199-201.
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of the GATT 1994 with respect to the parties' rights and obligations concerning
tariffs. Nor did the panel discuss the decision of the Trade Negotiating
Committee during the final days of the Uruguay Round on the role of paragraph
7 of the Marrakesh Protocol regarding tariffication. For these reasons, the
panel's conclusion deserves careful scrutiny.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE CENTRAL ISSuE IN DISPUTE
A. The Intent of the Parties
Because both the FTA and the Uruguay Round negotiations were
proceeding in 1987, one could surmise that article 710 was drafted precisely for
the purpose of incorporating Uruguay Round tariffication results into the FTA.
However, this is not the case. The panel did not purport to base its conclusion
upon any such negotiating history. As noted previously, the negotiating history
indicates that article 710 was intended to permit the use of absolute import
quotas or other non-tariff import barriers consistent with GATT article
XI:2(c)(i), the GATT Protocol of Provisional Application, or the waiver
granted to the United States by the GATT." 6 The text of article 710 further
supports this conclusion, as it explicitly refers to article XI of the GATT.
Furthermore, the parties to the NAFTA expressly confirmed that article 710
refers to the GATT Protocol of Provisional Application and waivers.117 Nothing
offered by Canada or cited by the panel indicates that the negotiators of article
710 had anything other than non-tariff import barriers in mind when they signed
the FTA in 1988 or when it was incorporated into the NAFTA in 1992.
There is nothing in the negotiating history of article 710 to indicate that this
provision was intended to apply to the tariffication of quotas in the Uruguay
Round. In fact, when FTA article 710 was originally drafted in 1987, no
contemporaneous Uruguay Round proposal called for tariffication. The first
tariffication proposal was made by the United States on November 9, 1988,
almost one year after the signing of the FTA. 18 Moreover, if the parties had
wanted article 710 to cover tariffication, they could have stated so when they
incorporated article 710 into the NAFTA and drafted the declaration of the
provision's intended coverage. The best evidence that the parties did not intend
article 710 to include tariffication is that Canada and the United States provided
an interpretation of FTA article 710 in the NAFTA but failed to mention
pending tariffication in the Uruguay Round. In contrast, Canada and Mexico did
negotiate NAFTA provisions in contemplation of tariffication in the Uruguay
Round. For all of these reasons, it is clear that article 710 was not "intended"
by the parties to apply to Uruguay Round tariffication.
In addition, FTA negotiating history does not indicate any intent to address
116. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
117. NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 702.1, para. 4.
118. See A Frameworkfor Agricultural Reform Submitted by the United States, supra note 62.
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GATT rights and obligations with respect to tariffs. This would have been odd
indeed, since the essence of a free-trade agreement is to provide more favorable
tariff treatment than that provided by GATT tariff bindings. If the parties
intended FTA article 710 to incorporate all of their GATT tariff rights, article
710 would have virtually negated the tariff commitments in the FTA and the
NAFTA for all agricultural, food, beverage, and related goods. Nonetheless,
without citing a scintilla of evidence and defying the basis upon which free-
trade agreements are founded, the panel concluded that the parties intended
FTA article 710 to apply to tariffs and to constitute an exception to the tariff
freeze and elimination provisions of the NAFTA.
The panel concluded, as Canada had acknowledged, that FTA article 710
did not permit Canada to ignore NAFTA tariff bindings with respect to the
within-quota rates of its tariff-rate quotas at issue or with respect to any other
import duty rates. Both Canada and the panel reached the curious conclusion
that the GATT tariff rights incorporated in FTA article 710 applied only to the
tariffs at issue in this dispute. This result could not have been intended by any
of the participants in the 1987 FTA negotiations or the 1992 NAFTA
negotiations.
Accordingly, the panel's decision was not based upon or dictated by the
negotiating history of FTA article 710. Furthermore, there is no indication that
the result reached by the panel was ever mutually intended by the parties, or
even by Canada alone. The panel's finding thus ignored the parties' actual
intentions and mistakenly concluded that the "right to apply the tariffs that
resulted from tariffication"119 was a right "under the GATT and agreements
negotiated under the GATT." 120
B. Legal Rights and Obligations Incorporated into the NAFTA
The validity of the panel's conclusion therefore depends on whether there
was a legal right to impose tariff rates arising from tariffication pursuant to a
provision of either (1) the GATT or (2) an agreement negotiated under the
GATT. The panel did not find that the GATT provided such a legal right.
However, most of the tariffs in dispute violated even Canada's legal obligations
under the GATT and would thereby also have violated Canada's obligations
under FTA article 710.
1. Rights and Obligations Under the GATT with Respect to Tariffs
The rights and obligations of WTO members with respect to tariffs are
generally covered by GATT articles II, XXIV, and XXVIII. 1 If the GATT
119. Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 199(b).
120. Id. para. 194 (discussing FTA article 710).
121. In addition, article VII contains obligations regarding the valuation of imports for purposes of
applying ad valorem customs duties. GATT, supra note 5, art. VII. Article XIX, the GATI escape clause,
permits the temporary suspension, modification, or withdrawal of.a tariff concession bound under article
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rights and obligations referred to in FTA article 710 include those relating to
tariffs, they must be analyzed in light of the provisions of GATT articles II,
XXIV, and XXVIII.
a. Article 11:1(b)
Article 1: 1 of the GATT provides the central rules. It generally requires
that a WTO member provide tariff treatment no less favorable than that
specified in its Schedule of Concessions to imports originating in the territories
of other WTO members. This article also exempts such imports from any
customs duty that exceeds the relevant rate in the importing member's Schedule
of Concessions.1" Tariff concessions on maximum tariff rates are usually made
during accession negotiations or during multilateral trade negotiations, and they
are recorded in the relevant member's Schedule of Concessions. A tariff rate
resulting from such a negotiated concession is referred to as a "bound" duty."
The Schedules of Concessions annexed to the GATT are integral to the GATT
itself.124
Article 11:1(b) permits WTO members that have not made a tariff
concession on particular imports to levy any rate of duty to such imports. The
member may then bind the particular rate of duty at any level agreed on during
negotiations."z Once a concession is made, import duties on goods originating
in other members' territories may not exceed the maximum rate bound by the
concession. 2
Canada had made tariff concessions on almost all of the goods at issue
prior to the Uruguay Round. 27 These concessions are listed in Canada's
Schedule of Concessions annexed to the GATT. Although Canada made
concessions during all of the rounds, some of the relevant tariff concessions
date back to the earliest rounds of tariff negotiations. The duties that Canada
II in the event that a tariff concession results, from unforeseen developments, in such increased quantities
of imports as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive
products. Id. art. XIX. Article I, the most-favored-nation clause, generally prohibits discrimination in the
application of tariffs and certain other measures. Id. art. I. Article XVIII regulates adjustments in tariff
concessions of developing countries. Id. art. XVIII.
122. Article lIIt(b) provides:
The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, which are the
products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the territory
to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in
that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided
for therein. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind
imposed on or in connection with importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this
Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation
in force in the importing territory on that date.
Id. art. II, para. l(b).
123. See DAM, supra note 23, at 30-31; JACKSON, supra note 14, at 201-11.
124. See GATT, supra note 5, art. II, para. 7 ("The Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby
an integral part of Part I of this Agreement.").
125. See DAM, supra note 23, at 25.
126. See HoEmAN & KosTcKu, supra note 41, at 31.
127. See Schedule V (Canada) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 43.
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has levied on the over-quota imports at issue are substantially higher than those
bound before 1995. The panel's final report does not indicate that the panel was
aware of these tariff bindings or that it considered the relevance of GATT
article 1:l(b). If FTA article 710 were to apply to tariff rights and obligations,
it would require Canada, in accordance with article I: l(b) of the GATT, to
provide the United States with treatment no less favorable than Canada's
pre-Uruguay Round tariff bindings.
b. Article XXVIII
Canada did not simply eliminate its prior tariff concessions by annexing its
schedule of Uruguay Round tariff concessions to the Marrakesh Protocol. Tariff
bindings are cumulative and remain binding until they are modified pursuant to
article XXVIII. Concessions made in later rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations supplement, but do not replace, concessions made in earlier
rounds." Since 1951, the GATT has consolidated concessions made in various
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations in a single Schedule of Concessions."2 9
Previous Schedules were also consolidated when GATT introduced the looseleaf
format 30 and converted to the Harmonized System of tariff nomenclature."' In
all of these exercises, the dates and rates of successive bindings were carefully
carried forward into the new schedules, thereby confirming the cumulative
nature of GATT tariff bindings.
Although rounds of multilateral trade negotiations normally result in tariff
reductions, negotiations pursuant to article XXVIII can actually result in tariff
increases. 32- Article XXVIII permits the modification or withdrawal of a tariff
concession bound under article II after negotiations with the WTO member with
whom the concession was initially negotiated, negotiations with the member
having a "principal supplying interest," and consultations with members having
a "substantial supplying interest."' Such negotiations are expected to maintain
the preexisting level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions by
providing for tariff reductions (commonly referred to as "compensation")
equivalent in value to the trade in goods affected by a tariff increase. Retaliation
is permitted if no agreement on compensation is reached.
128. SeeEuropeanEconomic Community-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers
of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86, 126-28
(1991) (discussing nullification or impairment of tariff concessions); JACKSON, supra note 14, at 203,
216-17.
129. See Rectification and Modification of Schedules and Consolidation of Schedules, Nov. 22, 1958,
GATF B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 113, 115-16 (1959) (establishing protocol for consolidating schedules).
130. See Introduction of a Loose-Leaf System for the Schedules of Tariff Concessions, Mar. 26,
1980, GATT B.I.S.D. (27th Supp.) at 22 (1981).
131. See GATI' Concessions Under the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System,
July 12, 1983, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 17 (1984).
132. See GAT Secretariat, TARIWI55IAdd.1, paras. 1-4 (Nov. 28,1985). Tariff bindings may also
increase with the formation or enlargement of a customs union pursuant to article XXIV:6. See GATT,
supra note 5, art. XXIV, para. 6.
133. See DAM, supra note 23, at 34-35; JACKSON, supra note 14, at 229-36.
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Interestingly, Canada did not claim to have undertaken article XXVIII
negotiations in the Uruguay Round, and the panel did not make any inquiry on
this issue. Canada also did not invoke the provisions of article XXVIII in the
Uruguay Round to modify its prior tariff bindings. Nor did Canada satisfy the
requirements of article XXVIII implicitly, as the panel report suggests, merely
by filing a new Schedule of Concessions at the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round.1"4 Canada's WTO Schedule of Concessions was annexed to the
Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT 1994. Paragraph 7 of the Marrakesh Protocol
addresses this issue:
In each case in which a schedule annexed to this Protocol results for any product in treatment
less favorable than was provided for such product in the Schedules of GATT 1947 prior to
the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the Member to whom the schedule relates shall
be deemed to have taken appropriate action as would have been otherwise necessary under
the relevant provisions of Article XXVHII of GAIT 1947 or 1994. The provisions of this
paragraph shall apply only to Egypt, Peru, South Africa and Uruguay.13s
Because Canada is not one of the countries listed in paragraph 7, it cannot be
presumed to have acted in accordance with article XXVIII simply because it
annexed its Schedule of Concessions to the Marrakesh Protocol.
The precise question whether countries undertaking tariffication of non-
tariff barriers to imports of agricultural products in the Uruguay Round should
be deemed to have modified their prior tariff bindings was raised during the
final weeks of the negotiations. The Uruguay Round Protocol contained in the
DFA had originally provided:
In cases of modification or withdrawal of concessions relating to non-tariff measures as
contained in Appendix Ell of the schedules, the provisions of Article XXVIH of the General
Agreement and the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII (BISD 27S/26) shall
apply. This would be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of contracting parties
under the General Agreement. 136
This provision would have required countries undertaking tariffication of non-
tariff barriers to negotiate compensatory adjustment or face retaliation. Just six
days before the conclusion of the negotiations, a proposal was made to exempt
the tariffication of agricultural non-tariff barriers from the requirements of
article XXVII. That draft provided:
For agricultural products, as defined in Annex 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, in each
case in which a schedule annexed to this Protocol results for any product in treatment less
favorable than was provided for such product in the Schedules of the General Agreement
1947 prior to the entry into force of this Protocol, the Member concerned shall be deemed
to have taken appropriate action as would have been otherwise necessary under the relevant
provisions of Article XXVIH of GAIT 1947 or 1994. For non-agricultural products, the
provisions of this paragraph shall also apply to the Schedules of Members listed in the Annex
134. Panel Report, supra note 2, paras. 188-89.
135. Marrakesh Protocol, supra note 16, para. 7.




This proposed language would have justified the modification or withdrawal of
Canada's prior tariff bindings on the agricultural goods at issue. This proposal,
however, was ultimately rejected by the negotiators in favor of the language
that currently appears mi paragraph 7 of the Marrakesh Protocol. Thus, the
negotiating parties explicitly refused to bless automatically tariffication that
produced tariff equivalents that exceeded prior tariff bindings.
Although the panel took note of the Marrakesh Protocol, it did not consider
it in its entirety. The panel failed to address the implications of paragraph 7 or
its negotiating history, despite its importance: Paragraph 7 is crucial for
determining whether Canada possesses any right under the GATT or an
agreement negotiated under the GATT to apply the over-quota rates of duty at
issue in this dispute.
c. Article XX1V
Furthermore, even assuming that Canada were to have some GATT right
to apply its tariff equivalents to imports from other WTO members, it would
not necessarily follow that Canada would also have a right under the GATT to
apply those tariffs to U.S.-origin goods. Article XXIV of the GATT 1994
contemplates that WTO members forming a free-trade area will eliminate all
customs duties and most other restrictions on trade.138 Article XXIV defines a
free-trade area as "a group of two or more customs territories in which the
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary,
those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, and XX) are eliminated
on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products
originating in such territories."39 While the provision requires only that a free-
trade agreement eliminate tariffs on "substantially all the trade" between the
parties, the only exceptions to tariff elimination would be those that had been
agreed upon by the parties.
Thus, article XXIV requires Canada to exempt imports of U.S. goods from
the rates of duty set out in its WTO Schedule, unless the United States has
agreed otherwise. In fact, Canada did not replace NAFTA tariff bindings with
WTO tariff bindings for any products other than the goods at issue, and even
with respect to these goods it observed NAFTA bound rates for in-quota
quantities. In so doing, Canada recognized its obligations under article XXIV
of the GATT 1994 for all other industrial and agricultural products and for the
in-quota rates for the disputed products. Absent an agreement by the parties to
exempt the goods at issue from the tariff elimination envisioned by article
XXIV, the United States was entitled to expect that Canada would comply with
137. Draft Uruguay Round Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, para. 7
(Dec. 9, 1993) (on file with author).
138. See DAM, supra note 23, at 276; JACKSON, supra note 14, at 583-84.
139. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV, para. 8(b).
1997]
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
its obligations under both NAFTA article 302 and GATT article XXIV and
exempt the disputed products from the over-quota tariffs. It is therefore
apparent that the panel completely ignored the role of article XXIV in the
system of GATT rights and obligations concerning tariffs.
2. Rights and Obligations Under Agreements Negotiated Under the GAYT
The panel's decision with respect to the application of FTA article 710 did
not rest on a right or obligation under the GATT, but rather on a right arising
from an agreement negotiated under the GATT.1  Focusing on article 4.2 of the
Agreement on Agriculture and its negotiating history, the panel concluded that
the "quid pro quo evident in the agreement" revealed that "the entitlement to
establish and apply tariff equivalents was, in the minds of the [Uruguay Round]
participants, inextricably linked with the obligation to remove non-tariff
barriers."1' It is in this supposedly shared mental state of officials representing
more than one hundred countries that the panel found a right arising from an
agreement negotiated under the GATT. This right, the panel concluded, was
incorporated into the NAFTA by FTA article 710 and provided Canada with an
acceptable legal exception to the tariff freeze and elimination provisions of
NAFTA article 302. This conclusion merits careful examination.
As noted previously, Canada had negotiated tariff bindings on virtually all
of the goods at issue prior to the Uruguay Round. Although no provision of the
GATT authorized the modification or withdrawal of Canada's pre-Uruguay
Round tariff bindings, an agreement taking precedence over the GATT could
provide the right to exceed such bindings. The general interpretive note to
annex 1A of the WTO Agreement specifies the agreements that prevail over
conflicting provisions of the GATT:
In the event of conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 and a provision of another agreement in Annex IA to the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization (referred to in the agreements in Annex JA as the "WTO
Agreement"), the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the
conflict. 42
Accordingly, if Canada's right to raise tariffs is grounded in an agreement
negotiated under the GATT, it must be listed in annex IA to the WTO
Agreement.
a. Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture
The Agreement on Agriculture is listed in annex 1A, along with a number
140. At the time the provisions of FTA article 710 were agreed upon, there was a variety of existing
agreements negotiated under the GAIT, including nine agreements, or "codes," concluded in the Tokyo
Round. Canada did not assert that it acted on the basis of any of the Tokyo Round codes or any similar
agreement in existence at the time the FTA was signed.
141. Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 181.
142. WTO Agreement, supra note 5, Annex IA, at 20.
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of other agreements that are not relevant to this dispute. According to the
general interpretive note, a provision of the Agreement on Agriculture would
thus prevail over a provision of the GATT 1994, such as article 11:1(b). For
instance, article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, prohibiting the use of
non-tariff barriers, was certainly meant to prevail over the conflicting
provisions of article XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT, which authorized the use of
quantitative restrictions under certain conditions. The issue is whether article
4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture was also intended to prevail over the
provisions of GATT article : l(b), which binds tariff concessions.
Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which contains the provisions
relating to market access commitments for agricultural products, provides:
1. Market access concessions contained in Schedules relate to bindings and reductions of
tariffs, and to other market access commitments as specified therein.
2. Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have
been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties', except as otherwise provided for
in Article 5 and Annex 5 hereof.
\1 These measures include quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum
import prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state
trading enterprises, voluntary export restraints and similar border measures other than
ordinary customs duties, whether or not the measures are maintained under country-specific
derogations from the provisions of the GATT 1947, but not measures maintained under
balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions
of the GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the
MTO.1
43
Although merely descriptive, rather than mandatory or even hortatory,
article 4.1 should not be overlooked, as it refers to the nature of the schedules
annexed to the GATT 1994. With respect to tariffs, it mentions concessions and
bindings, indicating that the legal obligations arising from the market access
negotiations are in the form of bindings familiar to the GATT. Article 4.1
therefore indicates that the Uruguay Round tariff rates applicable to agricultural
products are governed by the normal GATT tariff rules, namely articles 11:1
and XXVIII.14 This is fully consistent with previous GATT practice and with
the Uruguay Round goal of more fully integrating agriculture into the rules
applicable to trade in other products. The role of article 4.1 can be contrasted
with the purpose of article 3,145 which had to create new binding rules for
143. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 7, art. 4.
144. Even if article 4.1 required that tariffs be maintained at the bound rates, which it does not,
article XXIV of the GAT would permit Canada to exempt products of the United States or Mexico from
such MFN tariff rates. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIV.
145. Article 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides:
1. The domestic support and export subsidy commitments in Part IV of each Member's
Schedule constitute commitments limiting subsidization and are hereby made an integral part
of GATT 1994.
2. Subject to the provisions of Article 6, a Member shall not provide support in favour of
domestic producers in excess of the commitment levels specified in Section I of Part IV of its
Schedule.
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2(b) and 4 of Article 9; a Member shall not
provide export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of the agricultural products
or groups of products specified in Section n of Part IV of its Schedule in excess of the
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agricultural subsidies because the existing rules in GATT article XVI did not
relate to schedules, specify quantitative or budgetary outlay limits, or address
aggregate measures of support.146
Article 4.1 certainly does not authorize or require that any tariff rate be
increased to a level exceeding a previous binding. If this were the intended
function, then it would have been relatively simple for the negotiators to have
specified that the concessions and other market access commitments in a
member's Uruguay Round Schedule of Concessions replaced the concessions
made in prior rounds. As discussed previously, the negotiators explicitly
rejected this approach by defeating the proposed amendment to paragraph 7 of
the Marrakesh Protocol. 47 By contrast, article 4.1 merely embraces the existing
GATT tariff system for enforcing tariff concessions on agricultural products.
Ignoring article 4.1, the panel focused instead on article 4.2, which
prohibits WTO members from maintaining or reverting to "measures of the
kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties."
Canada based its defense primarily on the argument that the word "required"
in this phrase evidenced a legal obligation under the Agreement on Agriculture
to tariffy absolute quotas. Canada further argued that this legal obligation to
tariffy, incorporated into the NAFTA by FTA article 710, provided the
necessary exception to its tariff obligations in NAFTA article 302. The panel
rejected the Canadian approach in favor of discovering an implicit right to
tariffy in article 4.2.148
The text of article 4.2 bans maintaining, resorting to, or reverting to most
non-tariff barriers. It does not explicitly authorize the introduction of or an
increase in customs duties. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides that the provisions of an international agreement should be
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose."149
The panel's interpretation of article 4.2 as conferring a right to convert
quotas into tariff equivalents can be neither gleaned from the ordinary meanings
of the words used in that provision nor supported by its context or purpose.
Article 4.2 is one of two paragraphs in an article devoted to market access.
Paragraph 1 addresses tariff barriers to market access by noting that tariff
concessions are contained in the parties' schedules. Paragraph 2 addresses non-
tariff barriers by banning the use of such measures. Thus, the context of article
4.2 belies the interpretation given to it by the panel.
The panel's interpretation also fails to effectuate the purpose of article 4.2.
budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels specified therein and shall not provide such
subsidies in respect of any agricultural product not specified in that Section of its Schedule.
Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 7, art. 3.
146. See Brosch, supra note 80, at 868, 874.
147. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
148. See Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 171 (finding no obligation to tariffy in article 4.2).
149. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
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Its peculiar phraseology was intended to ban the same universe of non-tariff
barriers that were subject to tariffication during the negotiations. The
negotiating history of article 4 confirms this intention. The text of the
corresponding provision in the DFA stated: "Participants undertake not to
resort to, or revert to, any measures which have been converted into ordinary
customs duties pursuant to concessions under this Agreement." 10 This approach
defined the scope of the ban on non-tariff barriers in terms of the tariffication
modalities. This text did not contain the word "required" and, if adopted,
would merely have prohibited a member from resorting or reverting to
measures that in fact had been tariffied. Negotiators feared that this wording
would have allowed a member to avoid the impact of article 4.2 by simply not
converting its non-tariff barriers. In order to avoid this possibility, a subsequent
draft considered on November 20, 1993 proposed an amended article 4.2:
"Subject to the provisions of Article 5 and Annex Z of this Agreement,
participants undertake not to maintain or resort to any measures other than
ordinary customs duties on the importation of agricultural products.""' A
footnote defined the covered measures as:
quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, discretionary
import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state trading enterprises, voluntary
export restraints and all other border measures other than ordinary customs duties, but not
measures maintained for balance-of-payments reasons, under general non-agricultural
exception provisions, or in conformity with other relevant general provisions (Articles 111:2,
VI, VIII, XII, XVIII, XIX, XX and XXI of the General Agreement).1 52
This new approach sought to define the banned non-tariff measures by reference
to those listed in the footnote. The language-"any measures other than
ordinary customs duties" and "all other border measures other than ordinary
customs duties"-potentially would have applied to some measures not subject
to tariffication, such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures and classification
and grading standards. Thus, some participants believed that the language was
overly broad.
At a drafting session on November 25, 1993, the participants developed a
draft almost identical to the version ultimately adopted. 153 This draft attempted
to blend the two previous approaches by defining the scope of the non-tariff
barrier ban both in terms of the coverage of tariffication and with reference to
the positive list. The problem of the original approach-exempting measures
that participants refused to tariffy-was solved by substituting the phrase
"which have been required to be converted" for the original phrase "which
have been converted." This change was intended to prohibit the use of any of
the measures of the type or kind that were subject to tariffication in the
150. Dunkel Draft, supra note 77, at L.3.
151. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, art. 4, para. 2 (Nov. 20, 1993) (on file with author).
152. Id.
153. See Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, art. 4, para. 2 (Nov. 25, 1993) (on file with author).
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negotiations.'14
The terms and negotiating history of article 4.2 clearly demonstrate that it
was not intended to permit or require any actions regarding tariffs. Article 4.2
merely banned the use of non-tariff border measures described generally in
terms of the tariffication exercise and described explicitly in the footnote.
b. Part B of the DFA Text on Agriculture
When the text of article 4.2 was being settled in late November 1993, part
B of the Dunkel Draft was still on the table, thus forming part of the context of
article 4.2, and should serve as a guide to interpretation under article 31 of the
Vienna Convention."'5 Both paragraph 3 of part B and paragraph 3 of annex 3
of part B explicitly required that most non-tariff border measures be converted
to tariff equivalents. 156 Thus, the meaning of the phrase "required to be
converted" in article 4.2 could be ascertained by reference to the provisions of
part B that literally would have required tariffication had they remained in the
text. However, as the panel noted, such language was not included in the final
text of the Agreement on Agriculture.
If the original draft Text on Agriculture, including the draft provisions of
the tariffication modalities in part B, had been accepted in its entirety, Canada's
modification or withdrawal of pre-Uruguay Round tariff bindings might have
been justified. Canada then could have argued that the tariffication modalities
authorized or required specified increases in tariffs and therefore conflicted with
the provisions of article 11:1(b) of the GATT 1994. However, the participants
in the Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations decided to drop the draft
tariffication modalities. They were not included in the Agreement on
Agriculture, except as an attachment to annex 5 for purposes of future
tariffication of non-tariff measures. Part B and its tariffication modalities had
ceased to exist by the time Canada committed to tariffication and were in the
distant past by the time Canada actually implemented its tariff-rate quotas.
c. The Chairman's Note on Modalities
On December 20, 1993, Germain Denis, Chairman of the Market Access
Group, issued a note that contained the tariffication modalities of part B of the
DFA Text on Agriculture. 1 This document was not a negotiated agreement but
merely a Chairman's note-not even a note of the Chairman of the Negotiating
Group on Agriculture. Denis issued the note five days after the formal close of
the negotiations and stated that the modalities were being reissued "for the
purpose of completing draft Schedules of concession and commitments in the
154. The author participated in the revision of article 4.2.
155. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 149, art. 31.
156. See Dunkel Draft, supra note 77, at L.19, L.25.
157. See Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments Under the Reform
Programme: Note by the Chairman of the Market Access Group, supra note 91.
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Agricultural negotiations and for facilitating the verification process leading to
the establishment of formal Schedules to be annexed to the Uruguay Round
Protocol." 58 The note explicitly provided that the revised modalities were being
reissued "on the understanding of participants in the Uruguay Round that these
negotiating modalities shall not be used as a basis for dispute settlement
proceedings under the [WTO] Agreement."5 9 This statement sought to preclude
any member of the WTO from claiming legal rights or obligations arising from
the provisions of the modalities document.
The panel, however, relied heavily on the modalities document as the
source of Canada's legal right to nullify its NAFTA tariff commitments."6
While the panel acknowledged Chairman Denis' disclaimer that he was not
attempting to create enforceable rights, it nevertheless suggested that the
Chairman's note gave participants latitude to depart from the modalities, even
to the extent of applying tariffication to products not subject to non-tariff
barriers.' The panel completely misread the attempt by Chairman Denis to
exert control over dirty tariffication during the final preparation of the market
access schedules. Yet, the panel also recognized that he had no authority to
create legal rights and obligations by issuing a note after the conclusion of the
negotiations.
The panel suggested that part B of the DFA Text on Agriculture and the
modalities document constituted the travaux priparatoires to which reference
was appropriate under article 32 of the Vienna Convention.162 The panel further
indicated that the modalities document could be considered part of the context
of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture for the purposes of article 31(2) of the
Vienna Convention." However, these provisions of the Vienna Convention
would permit recourse to the negotiating history and modalities document only
to clarify an ambiguity in the text of article 4.2.11 Article 4.2 presents no such
ambiguity. It prohibits non-tariff border measures that were subject to
tariffication during the GATT negotiations. This unambiguous meaning of
article 4.2 cannot be twisted into an obligation or right to exceed previous tariff
bindings no matter how clear the discarded modalities may have been in
"requiring" tariffication.
Moreover, neither part B of the DFA Text on Agriculture nor the
modalities document constitutes an agreement in annex 1A of the WTO
Agreement that, according to the general interpretive note, would prevail in the
event of a conflict with GATT article 11:1(b). Accordingly, neither of these
documents authorizes Canada to violate its pre-Uruguay Round tariff bindings.
Furthermore, neither part B of the DFA nor the modalities document qualifies
158. Id. at 1.
159. Id.
160. See Panel Report, supra note 2, paras. 36, 177-79, 185, 187.
161. See id. para. 187.
162. See id. para. 179.
163. See id.
164. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 149, art. 31.
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as an "agreement negotiated under the GAIT" for purposes of FTA article 710.
Thus the panel did not incorporate these documents into the NAFTA via FTA
article 710.
If the right to implement tariff equivalents were rooted in the provisions of
part B or the modalities document, then compliance with those provisions would
be a precondition for invoking the right to tariffy. However, the panel did not
examine Canada's compliance with the modalities in establishing tariff
equivalents. 1" The panel was not concerned, for example, that tariffication
might have applied to products previously not subject to non-tariff measures,"
or to certain products-such as ice cream and yogurt-whose quotas had been
found to be GATT illegal. Ignoring these potential problems, the panel
extracted from the modalities the naked "right" to raise tariffs without imposing
any of the corresponding limitations.
In reality, the panel did not derive the right to tariffication from part B of
the DFA Text on Agriculture or the modalities document. Instead, it based the
"right" to tariffy on an implicit "bargain" in the negotiations in which "[s]tates
agreed to eliminate their non-tariff barriers as the quid pro quo for the right to
replace them with 'tariff equivalents.'"167 The panel located this right in the
context of the Uruguay Round rather than in any particular provision of the
Uruguay Round agreements. Although FTA article 710 only incorporates into
the NAFTA the explicit rights and obligations under the GATT and in
agreements negotiated under the GATT, the panel nonetheless concluded that
the implicit right to tariffy was incorporated into the NAFTA by virtue of FTA
article 710.11
d. Canada's GATT Schedule of Concessions
The panel considered whether the Canadian GATT Schedule of
Concessions could qualify as an agreement negotiated under the GATT for
purposes of FTA article 710. If it did qualify, it would sweep all of Canada's
MFN tariff rates for agricultural products into the NAFTA. Recognizing this
problem,1 96 the panel limited the incorporation of GATT tariff bindings to those
resulting from tariffication of the specific measures originally intended to be
covered by FTA article 710. Thus, the panel's holding implied that the
"agreement negotiated under the GATT" for purposes of article 710 only
consisted of certain tariff subheadings in the Canadian GATT Schedule of
Concessions. Despite the panel's narrow interpretation, a WTO member's
Schedule of Concessions is not an "agreement" in any real sense, even though
it is annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol.
Furthermore, there is no basis for claiming that the United States in fact
165. See Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 189.
166. See id. paras. 186-89.
167. Id. para. 185; see also id. paras. 180-84.
168. See id. para. 199.
169. See id. para. 196.
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agreed to Canada's tariff equivalents in the Uruguay Round. Although the
parties engaged in frequent bilateral negotiations on market access-especially
between November 1993 and April 1994-they failed to agree on how the
products subject to tariffication would be treated under the NAFTA.
Throughout these negotiations, the United States insisted that in the absence of
a bilateral agreement to modify, or provide an exemption from, the NAFTA
tariff obligations, Uruguay Round tariff-rate quotas could not be applied to
products originating in the United States. Canada insisted on maintaining its
supply-management programs and on U.S. acceptance of tariff equivalents. In
the end, Canada was the only major U.S. trading partner that failed to conclude
a bilateral agreement with the United States on market access for agricultural
products in the Uruguay Round.
The United States did not agree, simply by signing the WTO Agreement,
that Canada's tariff-rate quotas would apply to U.S.-origin goods. First, the
Marrakesh Protocol, to which Canada's Schedule of Concessions was attached,
clearly provided that only certain countries were deemed to have legally
modified or withdrawn their prior tariff bindings by filing a schedule containing
higher tariff bindings. 10 Second, in 1985, the GATT Secretariat advised the
Committee on Tariff Concessions that the annexing of schedules to protocols
was not binding on other contracting parties.' Finally, a GATT panel has
concluded that a country cannot evade its GATT obligations simply by inserting
a qualification in its Schedule of Concessions. 7 - For these reasons, merely
signing the WTO Agreement cannot be construed as an acceptance of Canada's
modification or withdrawal of its previous tariff bindings. Accordingly,
Canada's WTO Schedule of Concessions, in whole or in part, cannot constitute
"an agreement negotiated under the GATT" for purposes of FTA article 710.
V. CONCLUSION
Article 302 of the NAFTA prohibits Canada from applying the disputed
over-quota rates of duty to imports of U.S.-origin products unless some other
provision of the NAFTA provides otherwise. The only NAFTA provision that
may provide an exception to the tariff freeze and elimination requirements is
FTA article 710, which is incorporated into the NAFTA. This article allows the
parties to retain their rights and obligations under the GATT and agreements
170. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
171. See GATT Secretariat, supra note 132, paras. 1-4. The Secretariat explained:
It should be recalled that annexing schedules to a protocol is only binding on the contracting
parties in question which thereby commit themselves to apply in the future the new (normally
reduced) rates of duty. This does not, on the other hand, commit other contracting parties
which, in the case of increased duty rates and in the absence of an agreement, retain their right
to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions (e.g., under Article XXVIII:3 in the case of
the Dillon Round or in the Harmonized System negotiations).
Id. para. 3.
172. See United States Restrictions onImports of Sugar, June 22, 1989, GATr B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.)
at 341-43 (1990).
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negotiated under the GATT. The NAFTA panel found that Canada retained
such a right, authorizing it to breach its NAFTA tariff obligations. Yet this
retained "right" does not exist in either the GATT or an agreement negotiated
under the GATT. Indeed, such a right is inconsistent with the established law
of the GATT.
The panel did not base Canada's ability to implement the tariff-rate quotas
on its rights under the GATT. Had the panel addressed the GATT rules on
tariffs in articles II and XXVIII and recognized Canada's pre-Uruguay Round
tariff bindings, it would have been forced to conclude that Canada has no such
GATT right. To the contrary, the panel would have been compelled to find that
Canada's actions violated U.S. rights and Canada's obligations under GATT
article II: 1(b) with respect to Canada's previous tariff bindings and Canada's
GATT obligation to eliminate tariffs within a free-trade area.
The panel's conclusion is predicated instead on Canada's having the right
under an agreement negotiated under the GATT to apply Uruguay Round tariff-
rate quotas to U.S.-origin products. Although the panel considered the
Agreement on Agriculture, it ultimately did not find Canada's right to
tariffication in the language of that or any other agreement negotiated under the
GATT. The panel relied instead on its view of the implicit "bargain" between
the Uruguay Round negotiators to exchange non-tariff protection for tariff
equivalents. In doing so, the panel created a wholly new bargain that allowed
the tariffication of GATT-illegal quotas, the inclusion of products previously
not subject to non-tariff barriers, and the wholesale violation of prior tariff
bindings. Understandably, the panel had considerable difficulty finding an
adequate description for such a remarkable deal, which disregarded the actual
results of years of U.S.-Canada negotiations.
Moreover, the history of the multilateral negotiations demonstrates that the
negotiating parties did not intend to exempt tariffication from the provisions of
GATT articles II and XXVIII. Canada did not satisfy the requirements of
GATT article XXVIII to modify or withdraw its tariff bindings, and paragraph
7 of the Marrakesh Protocol clearly demonstrates that Canada could not meet
the requirements of article XXVIII simply through annexation of its Schedule
of Concessions.
The panel also fundamentally misperceived the bargains in the NAFTA and
the WTO Agreement. In order to gain admission to the NAFTA, Canada agreed
to eliminate all tariffs, including the tariffs at issue in this dispute. Canada
initially insisted on maintaining absolute quotas on imports of dairy, poultry,
and eggs. But the price of admission to the WTO was the elimination of non-
tariff barriers to imports of agricultural products. Canada could have refused
to sign the WTO Agreement, thereby avoiding the obligation to abandon its
quotas, or it could have notified the United States that it would withdraw from
the NAFTA unless it were permitted to modify its tariff commitments with
respect to the relevant goods. Hoping to reap the benefits of both the WTO
Agreement and the NAFTA, Canada chose neither course. By the end of the
negotiations, Canada surrendered its position on GATT article XI:2(c),
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abandoned its use of absolute quotas to defend supply management, relinquished
the protection of FTA article 710, and gambled the fate of its protected
industries on winning a favorable decision from a NAFTA dispute-settlement
panel. The gamble paid off. The panel's decision allows Canada to remain a
party to the NAFTA without having to pay its price of admission-the
elimination of all tariffs.
The panel failed to ascertain and apply the substantive law applicable to the
dispute before it. The decision appears to contradict basic GATT tariff rules
articulated in standard reference works by Professors Jackson and Dam." The
panel ignored those sources and also chose not to consult the GATT legal
secretariat, which might have provided informal advice about the GATT tariff
regime and possibly even a formal letter of legal advice. Moreover, the panel
could have requested that the parties themselves address these issues.
To combat the panel decision's shortcomings, and ensure uniformity in
decisions and treaty interpretation, the parties might consider creating a legal
staff, either located in the NAFTA secretariat or on retainer, to ensure that
panels have access to the needed legal expertise. At best, the first decision of
an arbitral panel under the dispute-settlement provisions of the NAFTA
represents a hard lesson about the difficulties of injecting the rule of
international law into the regulation of international trade. In the end, the panel
substituted its own view of substantial justice for a reasonable application of the
relevant legal rules. The panel concluded both that the parties had agreed in the
FTA to a degree of agricultural protectionism, albeit in the form of quantitative
restrictions rather than tariff-rate quotas, and that this bargain was not altered
by a subsequent agreement in the Uruguay Round to prohibit the use of
quantitative restrictions and convert to tariff equivalents. In effect, the panel
elevated the substance of protectionism over the legal form in which it is
exercised. As a result, the panel decision provided the protected sectors of
Canadian (and U.S.) agriculture with a decisive victory and support in their
efforts to block future attempts at liberalization. A decision in favor of the
United States would probably have encouraged further negotiations aimed at
eventually securing free trade in all agricultural products. This possibility has
now been lost for the foreseeable future. The panel's decision sided with the
interests of protectionism rather than the interests of trade liberalization, casting
an ominous shadow over the future of the NAFTA.
173. See DAt, supra note 23; JACKSON, supra note 14.
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